The US-Iran ceasefire may eventually ease the jet fuel costs that drove seven successive fare increases this year, but aviation experts warn that airlines have little incentive to pass savings on to travellers quickly, given sustained demand and the need to recover months of elevated operating costs.

Key Highlights

  • Jet fuel prices nearly doubled after the Iran war began, forcing airlines to cut routes and raise fares, with US domestic tickets running about 28% above year-ago levels and international fares up roughly 18%.
  • The global airline industry now expects to earn around $23 billion this year, down from a pre-war forecast of nearly $41 billion, with Middle Eastern carriers expected to collectively lose more than $4 billion.
  • Even when fuel costs fall, analysts expect airlines to maintain elevated fares until demand weakens in the autumn or winter, given that customers have continued to book at higher prices throughout the conflict period.

The US-Iran memorandum signed Thursday reopens the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global seaborne jet fuel exports pass. But the pathway from a signed deal to lower fares at the checkout is considerably longer than markets may assume. Oil fields, refineries, and logistics networks that were shut down or damaged during the conflict cannot restart overnight, and shippers will need to verify safe passage conditions before sending large tanker volumes back through the strait.

Even under an optimistic normalisation timeline, airlines face a structural disincentive to cut prices. Jet fuel accounts for between one-quarter and one-third of airline operating costs, and the carriers that absorbed the sharpest cost increases have been passing them through to passengers since February. US carriers raised fares seven times in that period with no meaningful drop-off in demand. That combination, persistent demand and demonstrated pricing power, removes the commercial urgency that would otherwise prompt fare reductions.

The pricing stickiness is a deliberate structural feature of how airlines manage costs. Operating expenses for the next three to four months are already contractually locked in for most carriers, meaning even a rapid decline in fuel spot prices would not immediately translate into lower unit costs. European airlines that hedged fuel costs through futures contracts entering the conflict are now establishing new hedges at higher forward prices, meaning their effective fuel costs are set to rise even as the underlying commodity potentially falls.

Spirit Airlines, which had already been under severe financial stress, shut down last month partly as a result of the additional burden imposed by fuel costs it could not absorb. The divide between large network carriers and budget operators that characterised the industry entering the conflict has deepened materially, with Delta and United reporting sustained demand even at elevated fares while thinner-margin carriers faced existential pressure.

Middle Eastern carriers have been hardest hit and are expected to lose a collective $4.3 billion this year against a pre-war forecast of $6.8 billion in profit. To compete for passengers, those carriers may need to reduce fares, which could eventually create competitive pressure on global routes and force some price reductions across the broader market.