Key Highlights

  • China cut crude imports by roughly 5.5 million barrels a day, about half, between February and June this year.
  • Stockpile drawdowns and reduced restocking accounted for an estimated 2.5 million barrels a day of China's total Import cut.
  • Beijing halted new refined fuel export contracts in March, cutting exports nearly in half to 430,000 barrels a day.
  • Falling domestic Demand cut June refinery throughput by 2.7 million barrels a day, with petrol output down 14%.

China's Import Cuts Helped Contain a Historic Supply Shock

The conflict involving Iran produced what analysts describe as the largest supply shock in the history of petroleum markets, yet oil prices never reached the roughly $150 a barrel level many had forecast at the start of the fighting. Several factors contributed to this outcome, including an additional 5 million barrels a day rerouted by Gulf producers around the blocked Strait of Hormuz, a record 2 million barrels a day of emergency stock releases by the United States and Japan, and demand rationing in poorer countries. A further, less visible Factor was a sharp reduction in Chinese crude demand.

Between February and June, China cut its crude imports by roughly half, or about 5.5 million barrels a day, a reduction analysts estimate may have kept Brent Crude prices $30 or more below where they would otherwise have traded. That decline exceeds half of the total global demand drop seen during the COVID-19 lockdowns, when worldwide demand fell by 9 million barrels a day. Unlike during the pandemic, when the global economy contracted sharply, China's broader economy continued to function through the period of reduced oil purchases.

Stockpile Management Was the Largest Single Lever

China's ability to adjust its stockpiles played the largest role in the import reduction. In the twelve months to early this year, as a perceived global oil glut pushed prices lower, China added roughly 200 million barrels to already substantial reserves of about 1 billion barrels, purchases that may have added an estimated $10 to $20 to global crude prices before the Iran conflict began. Once China's final pre-war cargoes from the Gulf had arrived by late April, the country began drawing down these reserves, with stockpiles falling by an estimated 70 million barrels by July, or roughly 150 million barrels including floating storage, equivalent to about 1.5 million barrels a day. Combined with reduced ongoing stockpiling of roughly 1 million barrels a day, stock management accounted for an estimated 2.5 million barrels a day of the total 5.5 million barrel-a-day import decline.

Export Controls and Falling Domestic Demand Contributed the Rest

Beijing's second lever was restricting fuel exports. In March, the government instructed domestic refiners to stop signing new export contracts and to unwind existing agreements, cutting China's refined product exports nearly in half to 430,000 barrels a day between February and April, including a steep reduction in jet fuel exports that alone saved an estimated 1.2 million to 1.8 million barrels a day of crude that would otherwise have been refined for export.

The third lever was a genuine contraction in domestic fuel consumption. Chinese refineries processed 2.7 million fewer barrels a day of crude in June than a year earlier, with petrol production down 14% and diesel and jet fuel output each down 21%. Higher domestic fuel prices prompted many urban residents to shift toward public transit, bicycles and electric vehicles, while some industrial and infrastructure activity that would have consumed diesel was postponed. China's petrochemical sector adapted in parallel, substituting coal and ethane-based feedstocks for petroleum-derived inputs that would ordinarily have come from Gulf crude.

Conclusion

China's demonstrated ability to reduce oil demand by more than 5 million barrels a day over several months gives Beijing an influence over global crude prices that increasingly rivals the production-side control OPEC has exercised for decades, though this capacity is not indefinite given finite stockpiles and limits to further demand suppression. Whether China can sustain a similar level of market influence in future supply disruptions will likely depend on how quickly it can rebuild depleted reserves and whether the structural shifts in domestic fuel demand, such as the continued adoption of electric vehicles, prove durable beyond the current period of elevated prices.